# Foundations of the logical theory of scientific knowledge by Zinov'ev A. A., Smirnov G. A., Sidorenko E. A., Fedina A.

By Zinov'ev A. A., Smirnov G. A., Sidorenko E. A., Fedina A. M., Bobrova L. A.

**Read or Download Foundations of the logical theory of scientific knowledge (Complex logic) PDF**

**Best logic & language books**

**Modality (Central Problems of Philosophy) **

This advent to modality areas the emphasis at the metaphysics of modality instead of at the formal semetics of quantified modal common sense. The textual content starts off via introducing scholars to the "de re/de dicto" contrast, conventionalist and conceptualist theories of modality and a few of the main difficulties in modality, fairly Quine's criticisms.

**Studies in Inductive Probability and Rational Expectation**

Three in philosophy, and accordingly in metaphilosophy, can't be in response to principles that steer clear of spending time on pseudo-problems. in fact, this suggests that, if one succeeds in demonstrating convincingly the pseudo-character of an issue by means of giving its 'solution', the time spent on it needn't be obvious as wasted.

**Argumentation: Analysis and Evaluation**

This booklet concentrates on argumentation because it emerges in usual discourse, even if the discourse is institutionalized or strictly casual. the most important ideas from the speculation of argumentation are systematically mentioned and defined with assistance from examples from real-life discourse and texts. the elemental rules are defined which are instrumental within the research and evaluate of argumentative discourse.

- Counterfactuals and Probability
- The Nature of Existence, Vol. 1 (Classic Reprint)
- Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson
- Philosophies of Mathematics
- An Introductory Logic
- Modal Logics and Philosophy, Second Edition

**Additional info for Foundations of the logical theory of scientific knowledge (Complex logic)**

**Sample text**

But if the semantics for a many-valued logic is described using a precise metalanguage, then sentences will always be assigned exact values, since sentences of the metalanguage ascribing degrees of truth will themselves be true or false simpliciter. The cluster of questions (6) has not always been directly confronted, but we outline several types of responses, which have been either defended or at least alluded to in the literature. Biting the bullet. First, we could accept that sentences do take unique exact (a)values, that there are sharp boundaries to the degree 1 sentences, that there is no higher-order vagueness, and that precise metalanguages are acceptable as they stand.

But suppose that "p" is true at some but not all points, so that "'p' is true" is true at no points. At those points where "p" is true, the conditional "if p, then 'p' is true" is false, since its antecedent is true and its consequent is false (compare the argument, p. 31, that A É DA is not always true). Consequently the biconditional (T) is also false at those points, and thus is not true simpliciter. g. Williamson pp. 26566; see also Machina pp. 17879). However, it remains the case that p entails and is entailed by Dp (the truth of p at the base-point guarantees the truth of Dp there, and vice versa).

Suppose additionally that the totality of these base-level facts fixes everything else. g. clouds or mountains) whose boundaries are left fuzzy. But what is true, false and left indeterminate about them would supervene on how things stand at the precise base level. Arguably, on this picture, any apparent ontic vagueness of the fuzzy-boundaried mountains etc. is merely superficial (compare the ontological framework of Lewis 1993). This suggests that to get a substantive thesis about ontic vagueness, we need to consider a contrasting picture of a world containing non-superficial vagueness, where the vagueness "goes all the way down".