By F. Zabeeh
Read or Download Avicenna's Treatise on Logic, Part One of Danesh-Name Alai: A concise philosophical Encyclopaedia and Autobiography (Pt. 1) PDF
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Extra resources for Avicenna's Treatise on Logic, Part One of Danesh-Name Alai: A concise philosophical Encyclopaedia and Autobiography (Pt. 1)
Reason does not demand a "true" or "false" judgment on claims or a "valid" or "invalid" judgment on arguments. The need to take action, and thus the need for choice, sometimes forces bivalence-that is, demands a yes or no to the claims of arguments-but this should not be confused with the demands of reason. Arguments can be better or worse, and their claims can be more or less compelling. Third, reason is a practice which has an essentially ethical motivation. The framework for argumentation is made up of ethical elements, and involves specifically ethical commitments.
Its aim is the unraveling of supposed communication, the undermining of apparently shared judgments, the expose of the general deferral of meaning. It is this inexhaustible and single-minded skepticism of deconstruction that decisively distinguishes it from rhetoric. Deconstruction in its strongest form is a negative hermeneutic, an endless interpretive tactic. A central text to consider here is Derrida's "Signature Event Context," one of the more important texts in increasing the attention to Derrida's thought in the United States, and the text which embroiled its author in a famously futile exchange with John Searle.
One of the major rifts in the teaching of writing has been along the question of whether teachers should teach specifically academic discourse to college students or whether they should, supposing they knew how, strengthen their students' abilities to write well in a discourse community of their own choosing. However, even among those who decide for academic discourse, the question of what rhetoric to teach is still a troubling one. For what is most significant about academic discourse is the strongly specialized writing conventions of the different disciplines and professions.