By B. Russell
Bertrand Russell is anxious during this e-book with the rules of data. He techniques his topic via a dialogue of language, the relationships of fact to adventure and an research into how wisdom of the constitution of language is helping our figuring out of the constitution of the world.
This version contains a new creation via Thomas Baldwin, Clare university, Cambridge
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Additional info for An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth
When we say “ I said ‘A ’ ” , what we really mean is “ I made a noise closely similar to the noise I am now about to make: *A* ” . This, however, is a digression. W e will revert to the supposition that I say first “ A ” and then “ B” . W e will call the particular occurrence which was my first utterance “ Tom ” , and that which was my second utterance “ Harry” . Then we can say “ Tom preceded Harry” . T his was what we really meant to say when we said “ the sound ‘A ’ pre ceded the sound ‘B* ” ; and now, at last, we seem to have reached an atomic sentence which does not merely classify.
For: let |3 be the class o f verbal utterances which is the spoken word “ Brutus**; let k be the class o f verbal utterances which is the spoken word “ killed**; and let y be the class of verbal utterances which is the spoken word “ Caesar**. Then to say that we can say either “ Brutus killed Caesar*’ or “Caesar killed Brutus** is to say that (x) there are occurrences * ,P , y , such that x is a member o f ft P is a member o f is a member o f y, x is just before P and P is just before^ ; (2) there are occurrences x \ P ', y fulfilling the above conditions as to membership o f ft k, y but such that y is just before F and F just before x .
W h a t happens w hen 23 AN IN Q U IRY INTO M EAN IN G AND TRUTH a m an says a w o rd I shall call a “ verbal utterance” ; w hat happens w hen a m an hears a w o rd I shall call a “ verbal noise” ; the physi cal o b ject w hich consists o f a w o rd w ritten o r printed I shall call a “ verbal shape” . It is o f course ob vio u s that verbal utter ances, noises, and shapes are distinguished from other utterances, noises, and shapes, b y p sych o lo gical characteristics— b y “ inten tio n ” o r “ m eaning” .