By John and Helen Steward, editors Hyman
This choice of unique essays by means of major philosophers covers the full variety of the philosophy of motion.
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Extra info for Agency and Action (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement; 55)
But I think that the explanation itself is not a factive one; there are just factive ways of wording it. The word 'because' renders the explanation factive, but only in the sense that it commits the explainer to the truth of the explanans; the explanation itself, which might have been given in other terms, remains stubbornly non-factive. That is, the fact that the explanation can be given in non-factive form shows that it is a non-factive explanation, even though that very explanation can be given in ways that (for trivial reasons to do with the use of certain words) are themselves factive.
For instance, we have the non-factive: His reason for doing it was that it would increase his pension. But we have factive ways of saying the very same thing, for instance: He did it because it would increase his pension. I take it that unlike the former, the latter cannot coherently be continued 'but he was sadly mistaken about that', which is the mark of its factivity. Should we say, then, that we have here two explanations of the same thing, two 'rational' or rationalizing explanations, one of which is factive and one of which is not?
Unlike theoretical or speculative knowledge, practical knowledge will not be passive or receptive to the facts in question, but is rather a state of the person that plays a role in the constituting of such facts. This is not to say that ordinary observation has no relevance here, but rather that it plays a different role than it does in the case of knowledge which is passive or receptive with respect to the facts in question. D—This idea of a difference in 'direction of fit' is also clearly behind Anscombe's appeal later in the book to a phrase which Aquinas uses in distinguishing the operations of the practical intellect from those of the speculative intellect.